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FRIENDSHIP AND PARTIALITY: TOWARD A THEORY OF
VIRTUE
HENRY CURCIO
Abstract. We take our friends to be different from others. Unlike the people
we pass while walking or acquaintances we have from our work, our friends
carry a special sort of value to us. That is to say, we are partial to our
friends. This much is seen regularly – maybe when we help our friend who
is struggling with work as opposed to any other co-worker. But, what sort of
theory supports this claim to partiality? In this paper I will outline a number
of accounts, all of which attempt to explain our partiality. I will argue that
each of these accounts is lacking and then give my own account of partiality.
A distinctly virtue ethical theory of partiality will prove to be best so far
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Trust, mutual reciprocity, well-wishing, and shared history are features of friend-
ship few would question.1 Partiality, the special preference we give our friend, is
similarly accepted but also generates specific ethical problems that these other fea-
tures do not.2 Indeed, (P) we should show partial concern for our friends. But, we
should also show impartial concern, or respect, for the dignity of all people. Let’s
call this principle of impartial concern or respect (I). When (P) and (I) come into
direct conflict, what should we do? Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett (2000) ad-
vance the position that we should opt for (P) if (P) and (I) come into conflict and
I agree with them.3 But this also generates its own problem. If we opt for (P) we
might act in a strictly immoral way on behalf of our friends. Because of this, C&K
show that friendship can lead us to moral danger. They conclude that friendship
is independent of moral values and even immoral friendships remain valuable. I
will show that the account of partiality they argue for is suboptimal. Then, I will
argue against other recent accounts of partiality. Finally, I will advance my own
position, a distinctly virtue ethical account of partiality and friendship. Against
C&K, this account will show that friendship is inextricably connected to moral
values (especially our moral education) and that a strictly immoral friendship is in
fact no friendship at all.
1 Features of reciprocity and well-wishing have been included since Aristotle’s account of friend-
ship. See his Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999),
(1155b34) and (1156b9-10). Interestingly, trust appears only in the periphery on his account. For
more on trust, see Mark Alfano, “Friendship and the Structure of Trust,” in From Personality to
Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character, ed. Alberto Masala and Jonathan Webber, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 186-206. On the topic of shared history, see Thomas
Hurka, “The Goods of Friendship,” in Thinking About Friendship: Historical and Contemporary
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Damian Caluori, (New York: Palegrave Macmillan, 2013), 201-
217. Especially, see Amelie O. Rorty, “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love Is Not
Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed.
Neera Kapur Badhwar, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 73-88.
2 For a clear argument that friendship in particular is partial, see Troy Jollimore, “Friendship
Without Partiality?” Ratio 13, (2000), pp. 69-82.
3 Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” The Journal of Phi-
losophy 97 (2000), pp. 278-296. Hereafter C&K.
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2. Partiality and the Project View
C&K argue two varieties of theses in their article. First, the traditional, largely
Aristotelian, conception of friendship is far too moralized. Second, the partial
nature of friendship can lead us morally astray. So, friendship is frequently not
grounded in morals and, on their account, likely independent of moral values. De-
spite this, C&K still regard friendship, even immoral ones, as a good.
So far as I am concerned, I agree that some accounts of friendship are far too
moralized. One such example that they point to is Nancy Sherman (1993) who
states that “each [friend] is inspired to develop himself more completely as he sees
admirable qualities... manifest in another whom he esteems.”4 One need not search
far to find friendships that don’t quite fit this model – imagine a group of amiable
drinking buddies. Are they trying to develop moral virtues in themselves and
one another? Likely, no. In agreement, Alexander Nehamas (2016) remarks that
sometimes it is the smaller things we appreciate about our friends. And sometimes
it is the less than perfectly moral qualities in our friends that we appreciate most.5
So, it is fair to say that this account of friendship is over moralized. But what can
be said about the related thesis that the value of friendship is independent of moral
value? Consider an example C&K pose when they acerbically joke, “a friend will
help you move a house, a good friend will help you move a body.”6
You’ve been sitting at home and enjoying your last few hours of the weekend
before you head to bed – all the while attempting to forget about the upcoming
work week. Your close friend, Denise, sends you a text message... “I’ve gotten
myself into a little bit of trouble and am gonna need some help. Are you around?”
Concerned for her well-being, you respond with a quick “yes” and she tells you
4 Nancy Sherman, “Aristotle on the Shared Life,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed.
Neera Kapur Badhwar, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 105. For a perspective on the
moral nature of friendship in relation to justice, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971), sections 70 74. For a view on the moral nature of friendship and
its relation to feminism, see Marilyn Friedman, “Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the
Community,” in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993), pp. 285-302. And, for an influential account of friendship as a moral
phenomenon, see Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, (New York: Routledge,
1980), 67-83.
5 Alexander Nehamas, Of Friendship, (New York: Basic, 2016), 27-28. In the words of Susan
Wolf (1982): “I don’t know if there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither
I nor those about whom I care most are among them.” Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal
of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp 419.
6 Cocking and Kennett, 278.
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that she will be at your house in a few minutes. She knocks. Upon opening the
door, you find Denise standing there with an oversized black trash bag containing
a dead body that she hopes to get rid of with you. So, should you remain partial
to your friend and help her? I am inclined to say no due to the immoral nature
of the act. But, given the fact that you truly value this friendship, C&K seem to
think you should help your friend. This conclusion is far too hasty and is the result
of an objectionable account of partiality. In this section, I will argue against their
account of partiality.
Hesitant to accept C&K’s conclusion, one might wonder, is a relationship that
leads us morally astray truly a friendship at all? C&K would say yes.7 They
address this objection in two directions. First, it is clear that friendship requires
trust: without loss of generality, if one is a notorious liar it’s hard to trust that
they may not lie to their friend, and if one is not trusted you can hardly call them
a close friend. Against this, C&K explain that we frequently act partially to our
friends. One might lie to others, but, when restricted to the confines of friendship,
are entirely trustworthy. Second, a concern of exploitation is raised: a real friend
would rarely purposefully involve you in a problem of theirs that could lead to you
getting into trouble (that is cover for them, lie for them, etc.) because then they
would be exploiting you and no good friend would exploit their friend. Against
this, C&K note that when we are between a rock and a hard place it is usually our
friends that we turn to. And, it is not against friendship to help a friend (even if it
calls for moral wrongdoing).8
Both defences hinge on the ways we might expect friends to be partial to one an-
other. In the first, we find C&K explaining away a problem of trust using partiality
toward friends. Because we are partial to our friends, we would never lie to them – a
point that seems true and relatively uncontroversial. In the second, C&K implicitly
acknowledge that asking for help from a friend presupposes a partial relationship;
one in which we will act upon the behalf of our friends’ immediate concerns. While
it is true that helping a friend is not against friendship, their following point that
7 For a similar analysis, see Nehamas, 59-63 and 187-200.
8 Much of this is a narrower reformulation of Susan Wolf’s (1982) argument that ‘moral saints’
are unsuitable as human ideals. C&K show us with similar force that our standard, moralized,
philosophical interpretations of friends appear inadequate, see Wolf (1982), pp. 419-424.
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acting partially for our friend is fine even if it leads to moral wrongdoing rests on
an objectionable account of partiality.
It seems as though C&K conceive of partiality in friendship as a combination of
“mutual affection, the disposition to promote the other’s serious interest and well-
being, and the desire for shared experience.” They add that, “friends are character-
istically receptive to being directed and interpreted and so in these ways drawn by
each other. As a close friend of another, I shall be especially disposed to be directed
by her in our shared activities.”9 That is to say, by being friends with someone,
their serious interests and well-being direct my preferential attitude toward them.
This account of partiality is not uncommon and is sometimes referred to as
the project view.10 Bernard Williams (1981) makes note of “ground projects” that
constitute the identity of an agent and their sense of meaning in life.11 On his
account, these ground projects constitute such a large sense of identity and meaning
that one ought to act partially toward them, and, although Williams makes no
direct comment on friends, it seems fair to say that he would conceive of a friend
as someone who acts partially for your ground project when needed. Susan Wolf
(1992) supports another version wherein we express our individuality through our
ties, especially to others. These ties constitute a certain kind of project that directs
us to reasons for partiality.12
At first glance, this view seems plausible. There certainly exist such things as
ground projects that help constitute our identity. And, because we cannot imagine
living without them, they may certainly generate reasons for partial behavior on
their behalf. But, on further inspection, the project view is lacking in some regards.
This much can be observed in friendship so far as on the project view, friendship is
supported by a shared ground project and partiality. But we can conceive of cases
where there is a friendship with partiality but no ground project and cases where
there is a friendship with a ground project but no partiality.
9 Cocking and Kennett, 284.
10 The terminology of ‘project view’ and ‘relationship view’ referenced are drawn from Troy
Jollimore’s article, “Impartiality”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta
11 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981), 12-13.
12 Susan Wolf, “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992), 252.
6 HENRY CURCIO
We can start with an example of a friendship where there is partiality but no
ground project. Consider the friendship I share with the staff of my local pizza
restaurant.13 They are kind to me and have been serving food to me for over a
decade. I speak with them regularly and we mutually update each other on our
lives. I can confidently say that we share a particular kind of friendship, and further
I admit that I would do many things for these people because I feel partial to them.
But, I wouldn’t go so far as to say that they constitute any sort of ground project
for me the same way my significant other does. So, some partial relationships are
not ground projects.
What’s more, we can imagine a friendship that shares a ground project, but
is not partial. For example, a ground project of mine is my obsession with the
band Steely Dan. Indeed, I have a number of people who I consider friends that
I discuss Steely Dan with because we share these ground projects. But, simply
because we all love Steely Dan does not lead us to any sort of partiality to one
another. Moreover, our love of Steely Dan simply does not give any good reasons
to be partial – certainly not in the same way I am partial to my significant other.
Harry Frankfurt (2004) aids the project view by outlining what he calls reasons
of love.14 What is most interesting about his account is the addition of the bio-
logical/psychological notion of higher order volition. That is, second order desires;
desires about desires, or to desire to change what one is desiring. He argues that
these higher order volitions constitute a clearer picture of what really matters to
us.
This much seems promising. Once scrutinized, my friendships united by Steely
Dan seem to be lacking. They are something my first order desires affirm because
of the shared ground project, but my second order desires may not because of the
lack of any kind of partiality. Similarly, my friendship with the staff of my local
pizza restaurant may be affirmed by my first order desires so far as I am partial to
them. But, a ground project is lacking so my second order desires may not affirm
this as a friendship that really matters.
Although even with this, a concern of transparency may be leveled against Frank-
furt. That is, “we tend to be rather poorly informed of our own attitudes and
13 For more, see Pizza Pete’s located on 86th and Columbus Avenue in New York City.
14 Harry Frankfurt, Reasons of Love, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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desires” to such a degree that they might not be the best indicator for decision
making.15 One such example might be that of a drug addict. While in a moment
of withdrawal both their first and second order desires agree with using more. But,
as we all know, in the long run that is likely not the best decision in terms of their
well-being. Would being partial to your friend who is a drug addict in withdrawal
look like acting upon their second order desires if those desired constituted giving
them more of what was causing this pain? I’d hope not.
Let’s return to where we left off with Denise. Indeed, you might find yourself
in a scenario where your friend asks you to help them move a dead body. While
acting partially might look like helping Denise move the body, it is not always.
Another way you may be partial to her in this scenario is by refusing help and
telling her to phone the police (barring a criminal-justice system that will not lead
to the rehabilitation of your friend). That is, keeping a careful eye on her long-term
well-being, even if she’s lost sight of it.16
To be clear, this opens my position to a rather strong objection of elitism so far
as my comment might be taken as condescending. If I object to Denise moving the
body and refuse to help her because it is not constitutive of her well-being or in her
best interest, she might scoff at me all while thinking, ‘what does this guy know
about my interests and my well-being?’ This concern is real and I hope to return
to it later.
We have now spent time considering the project view, what I take C&K’s position
of partiality to be. Considering the multiple objections leveled, it seems reasonable
to say that the project view may not be the best formulation of what partiality
looks like, especially in friendship. For that reason, it seems that we ought to leave
the project view and consider another option.
15 Frankfurt, p. 21 n. 6.
16 What if Denise is strictly speaking innocent, and, as I mentioned, there exists a criminal-
justice system in place that will only serve to punish her unjustly. This scenario will certainly
put you in a bind. But, if Denise is truly innocent, you still might refuse to help move the body.
Instead, you might help in another way – for example, getting a good lawyer for her, defending
her with a testimony in court, or paying for her legal fees.
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3. The Relationship View and More
The relationship view is another live theory of partiality considered by many
philosophers. It contends that partiality is found in the ethical significance of our
special relationships and that this ethical significance directs us to reasons of par-
tiality. The relationship view is far broader than the project view so far as it
encompases a number of distinct but similar theories. For example, Joseph Raz
(1989) explains that friendship is intrinsically valuable because the relationship di-
rects us to particular duties of friendship.17 Niko Kolondy (2003) makes a similar,
but not equivalent, claim by arguing that our friendships have “final value” and
these final values direct us to special reasons of partiality in our relationships.18
And, Samuel Scheffler (2004) offers a stance that describes non-instrumental rela-
tionships as directing us to duties of friendship.19 These are only three of many
examples, but I take Raz’s view to be the most general example of the relationship
view.
The key idea to the relationship view is that we should not value our relationships
for their instrumental value, but instead for the non-instrumental value or for their
own sake. An example might be that of a parent and a child. A child certainly has
little to no instrumental value for a parent.20 The child is unable to provide for
themself and gives little to the parent besides lack of sleep. But, the parent still loves
their child nonetheless. That is, the parent loves their child non-instrumentally.
And, their bond is a special one so far as it does not need to rely on instrumental
value. This is not to say that special relationships cannot also hold instrumental
value. But, it does make the claim that special relationships ought to be rooted in
concern for the other in and of themself. Raz continues by explaining that if you
have a relationship as intrinsically valuable or rooted in non-instrumental concern,
then this relationship provides special reasons for partiality.21
17 Joseph Raz, “Liberating Duties,” Law and Philosophy 8 (1989), pp. 3-21.
18 Niko Kolondy, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” The Philosophical Review 112 (2003), pp.
135-189.
19 Samuel Scheffler, “Projects, Relationships, and Reasons” in Reasons and Values: Themes
From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz ; ed. R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler,
and Michael Smith; (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 247-269.
20 For a similar argument, see Plato, Lysis, translated by David Bolotin, (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1979), 207d5-210d8.
21 Raz, 18-19.
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This view, like the project view, seems promising. But, I will argue two reasons
to be sceptical of it. First, it attempts to remove a relationship from its context in
a way that is only troublesome. For example, on the relationship view a parent-
child relationship would be considered intrinsically valuable. Yet, it is very possible
that the parent is abusive. So, it seems to me as though the child should feel
little reason to be directed to particular duties toward that parent. In the case
of friendship we run into similar problems. When two people deem themselves
friends yet their friendship is demonstrably toxic or exploitative for both parties
(for whatever reason), it seems reasonable to say that these friends should not
be directed toward particular duties for one another simply because the relation
of friendship is valuable in and of itself. This is all to say that the context of a
relationship matters. And, the relationship view attempts to remove the context
of a relationship in such a way that hurts the view.
The second objection follows the first and is a particular reformulation of ethical
self-effacement that is undesirable.22 Self-effacement occurs when a theory tells
us that we should not be motivated by the considerations that justify our actions
under that theory. In essence, it outlines a schism between motives and reasons.
Consider an example where we act partially for our friend. Maybe they are about
to die while bungee jumping and you are able to save them. On the relationship
view, your motive for saving your friend would be because we have a duty to our
friendship. This much seems strange because one would assume your motive is
simply that their life was in jeopardy and you could not imagine a life without
them. This shows another way in which the relationship view removes the context
of a relationship. Of course the relationship would be in jeopardy in a scenario
like this, but what really should be motivating you is not the relationship, nor the
duty to maintain it, but your friends well-being.23 While this objection may not
22 For a thorough account of self-effacement, see the classic article by Michael Stocker, “The
Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 453-466.
Stocker also maintains some interesting positions on friendship. For his work on friendship, see
his “Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship,” The Journal
of Philosophy 78 (1981), pp. 747-765 and “Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations,” in
Identity, Character, and Morality, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty, (Cambridge: MIT
University Press, 1990), pp. 338-374.
23 I believe a similar objection can be made against the project view. For example, if you were
to save our friend in a bungee jumping accident, you would be forced to tell them that they
constitute a ground project of yours. Certainly a regard for your friend seems missing in this
response. As such, your motives and actions appear separate from one another in such a way that
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seem significant, a theory that is self-effacing will only serve to confuse an agent so
far as their practical reasoning becomes divided. That is, their actions, found in
saving their friend, and their motives, located in duties toward friendship, seem to
be divided or misaligned. As such, there will be a deficiency in action guidance and
the theory will not be able to properly explain the motives that are situationally
salient in a given scenario.
So, what is especially unsatisfactory about the project view and the relationship
view is the way they direct our attention. The relationship view directs the agent’s
attention away from the friend in favor of the friendship. ‘I am partial to you
because friendship tells me to do so.’ The problem with both of these is that they
direct the attention from what really matters – your friend.
Peter Railton (1984) argues an influential account of partiality for the conse-
quentialist.24 Like Mill, he claims that a consequentialist agent need not actually
change much of their daily preferential decision making.25 Instead, he proposes that
a sophisticated consequentialist will develop a kind of disposition toward impartial
consequentialist aims and goals that emerge when called upon in very specific sce-
narios. That is, the behavior of this sophisticated consequentialist will be similar
to that of a non-consequentialist (largely speaking partial and for the sake of their
friend) with a qualification that they will occasionally be drawn to impartial con-
cerns.26
Railton maintains that a sophisticated consequentialist can intentionally act par-
tially in a way that brings about less than maximally ideal consequences. Against
this, when a sophisticated consequentialist acts partially in a way that brings about
is not necessarily self-effacing, but certainly self-centered. That is, the project view directs the
agents attention to something self-centered so far as an agent’s response must be something along
the lines of, ‘I am partial to you because you are an important part of my project’ or ‘I am partial
to you because you are my project.’
24 Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 13 (1984), pp. 134-171.
25 Mill’s move is argued as such: “They say [that utilitarian standards] require that people
shall always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society. But this is to
mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the
motive of it... The great majority of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world,
but for that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the
most virtuous man need not on these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned,
except so far as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights
– that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations – of any one else.” For more, see John Stuart
Mill, Utilitarianism, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001 [1861]), 18-20.
26 Railton, 148-156.
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less than maximally ideal consequences, they must still hold that acting in this way
is morally wrong. This is certainly counter to common sense morality.27 If the
agent knows that acting partially in some instance is morally wrong, why not be
motivated by the impartial concerns of morality? So, this account still leaves much
to be desired so far as the looming knowledge of morality may serve to confuse the
agent.28
Although, something important does emerge from this account. Specifically,
Railton’s focus on dispositions is of interest. It seems reasonable to think of our
partiality as some sort of disposition. I cannot help but be partially to my friend
(or so the story goes). And, as neuroscientists John Cacioppo and William Patrick
(2008) claim, there is something biological that drives us to partial behavior.29
Similarly, Frankfurt claims that there is some “volitional configuration [that] shapes
the disposition and conduct” of the friend.30 So, it seems reasonable to consider
my partiality as something dispositional. When saving my friend from a bungee
jumping accident, the content of my thoughts are not ‘I ought to help my friend
because of my relationships with them’ or ‘I ought to help my friend because they
are a ground project of mine.’ We simply act out of disposition in that moment
because we are drawn to help our friend in need.31
An influential Kantian account of partiality is given by David Velleman (1999).
Velleman explains our partial behavior as resulting from the limitations of human
emotion. He claims that loving someone exhausts our emotional attention. So, by
loving someone, we no longer have enough emotional attention to give to others.
In doing this, Velleman keeps the spirit of impartiality alive. The corollary to his
27 This point is also made by Troy Jollimore in Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality, (New
York: Routledge, 2001).
28 Much literature has been published in response to Railton’s indirect consequentialism and the
theory still fosters debate. For a classic response to Railton, see Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley’s
“Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation,” Ethics, 106 (1995), pp.
86-111. For more recent debate against and for indirect consequentialism, see Robert Card,
“Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique,” Pacific Philosophy Quarterly
85 (2004), pp. 149-172 and Matthew Tedesco, “Indirect Consequentialism, Suboptimality, and
Friendship ,” Pacific Philosophy Quarterly 87 (2006), pp. 567-577 respectively.
29 John Cacioppo and William Patrick, Loneliness: Human Nature and the Need for Social
Connection, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 205.
30 Frankfurt, 43.
31 Williams (1981) also makes this point cf. 18. And, Frankfurt follows a very similar thought
cf. 35-37.
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argument would be: if we had greater emotional attention or were not so limited
as humans, we would be able to remain impartial.32
While Velleman’s account makes room for partiality in the Kantian framework,
it sadly provides little with respect to action guidance. That is, he makes lit-
tle attempt to explain how exactly we ought to be partial to our loved one or
friends. Still, I find this account particularly convincing for a number of reasons.
It makes ample room for the distinctly emotive qualities of friendship. Explic-
itly, Velleman describes the love for our friends as “an arresting awareness” of
our friends’ value that specifically arrests “our tendencies toward emotional self-
protection from” them.33 This much strikes me as reflecting the dispotional nature
of friendship already touched on above. And especially, it describes our partiality
as a particular kind of skill. Implicitly, Velleman makes the claim that we ought
to be careful in regard to those we are partial to. With only a finite amount of at-
tention, it is important that we learn to focus our partiality to relationships we see
as worthwhile and full of trust – especially considering that these deep connections
arrest our tendencies of emotional self-protection and make us deeply vulnerable.34
More recently, Daniel Koltonski (2016) has also constructed a Kantian account of
partiality with respect to friendship that clears up the concerns of action guidance
mentioned in Velleman’s account.35 He follows a very direct link to the Kantian
tradition so far as it renews one of Kant’s own claims. Specifically, that we ought
to show respect to the “expression... of a rational being” and that autonomy is
“the ground of the dignity of a human and of every rational nature.”36 Framed by
the context of moral disagreement, Koltonski argues that we ought to be partial to
our friends when they provide good reasons. So, the position makes the claim that
we ought to be partial to our friends if they provide reasons to be partial that have
properly engaged with moral deliberation. Koltonski takes this to be the case even
32 David Velleman, “Love as Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109 (1999), pp. 362-373.
33 Velleman, 361-362.
34 This concern of vulnerability is also raised directly by Kant when he warns against letting
our friends too close to us. See his Lectures on Ethics, translated by Peter Heath, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 118.
35 Daniel Koltonski, “A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body: Friendship and the Problem
of Moral Disagreement,” The Philosophical Review 125 (2016), pp. 473–507. Much of his account
is grounded in Kyla Ebels-Duggan’s Kantian account of love “Against Benefice: A Normative
Account of Love,” Ethics 119 (2008), pp. 142-170.
36 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor and
Jens Timmermann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 [1785]), 4:436.
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if you believe to have better reasons – such deference is to respect the autonomy
and rationality of your friend. Extending Velleman’s account, Koltonski makes the
claim that our love and partiality for our friends arrests “our tendencies toward
what might be called practical or deliberative self-protection.”37
Against this, and parallel to our objection to Railton’s account, Koltonski allows
for an agent to make a subpar rational decision while knowing a better option. And,
this much seems to fly in the face of Kantian thought. Even if Denise offers you
good reasons that have properly engaged with moral thought to move this body
with her, it would still seem puzzling to do so if you too have other good reasons
that allow the immoral action to not happen. Like Railton’s, this account still
leaves much to be desired so far as it may confuse the agent.
So, it seems as though both the consequentialist and Kantian formulations of
partiality are lacking because both seem to be liable to confuse the agent. Al-
though the dispositional nature of partiality and the fact that we might conceive
of partiality as a particular kind of skill jumps out as important. This is certainly
true for a virtue ethical account of partiality. Both disposition (hexis) and skill
(techne) will be fundamental aspects of a virtue ethical account of partiality (or so
I will argue). In the next section I will motivate this point and flesh out the virtue
ethical position of partiality in friendship.
4. A Virtue Ethical Approach to Partiality and Friendship
In the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates ask Theaetetus whether we ought to have
concern for “the most distant proverbial Mysians.”38 Discussion of partiality, it
seems, are not absent from the ancient philosophers who prioritized virtue. But,
there is no clear agreement among the virtue theories. So, to sort this out we
will need to employ a degree of creativity in constructing a pastiche of the ancient
theories. I will discuss the virtue systems of Mencius, Aristotle, and the Stoics to
describe what components of them remain viable considering the objections leveled
above. The goal will be to synthesize this into a coherent theory of partiality. The
37 Koltonski, p. 487 n. 26.
38 Plato, Theaetetus, translated by Christopher Rowe, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), (209b7-8).
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result will reinforce recent modern attempts at describing our partiality; specifically
that of Iris Murdoch (1970) and Lawrence Blum (1980).39
To begin, we should outline the positions of Murdoch and Blum in order to
set our sights on what exactly is relevant when drawing on the ancient theories.
Against the positions argued above, Murdoch and Blum both take our partiality
as something that cannot be reduced down to “an explicit set of arguments and
positions.” Blum points out that there are “certain concerns, general orientations of
thought, intellectual tendencies, metaphors, and the like which do not necessarily
congeal into definite views or positions” in our partial decision making.40 And
further that emotions, especially altruistic ones, “cannot be regarded as natural
processes external to our moral agency.”41 Their goal in making these claims is to
focus the attention of partial decision making back onto the individual. That is,
the individual as a whole as represented outside of their rationality.
To do this, Murdoch proposes a method of “really looking” where we place “a
just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality.”42 That is, we must pay
acute attention to the individual and observe, as Blum puts it, “the weal and woe”
of those close to us.43 This much strikes me as uncontroversial and almost as
commonsense when being partial to another person. It is a matter of disposition
for us to observe “the weal and woe” of our friends so we know how to be partial to
them – for example, to comfort one’s friend. This shifts the partial gaze away from
the self (as found in the project view) and away from the relationship (as found in
the relationship view) and back onto the individual in and of themself. That is, it
removes the cognitive step of observing that a person is a ground project, or holds a
specific relationship to the agent, and tells the agent to simply observe what factors
of the situation are salient for partial action toward their friend.
39 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, (New York: Routledge, 1970) and Lawrence A. Blum,
Friendship, Altruism, and Morality, (New York: Routledge, 1980).
40 Blum, 10. Murdoch makes a similar point about metaphor in moral reasoning when she says
that “the development of consciousness in human beings is inseparably connected with the use of
metaphor” (pp. 75).
41 Blum, 83.
42 Murdoch, 89 and 33. This much Murdoch borrows from fellow Platonist Simone Weil. For
more information on Simone Weil and her idea of attention as a philosophical concept, see A. Re-
becca Rozelle-Stone and Benjamin P. Davis’ article, “Simone Weil,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta.
43 Blum, 76.
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What’s more, the attention we place on others, which we take as a disposition,
develops into particular skills. As Murdoch puts it, “we often apprehend more than
we clearly understand and grow by looking.”44 That is, the attention we place on
others is a certain kind of moral perception that forces us to ask how we can be
moral to our loved ones in a given scenario. And, answering this question with
“clear vision” results in moral insights and specific moral skills to be perfected.45
Murdoch makes this point clear to us when she further explains that
“at the level of serious common sense and of an ordinary non-philosophical
reflection about the nature of morals it is perfectly obvious that goodness
is connected with knowledge: not with impersonal quasi-scientific knowl-
edge of the ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a refined and
honest perception of what is really the case.”46
This entails what was already stated above – that “really looking” forces us to use
a set of moral skills. But also, this entails that our partial moral gaze aids in our
moral education. Without loss of generality, our friendships give us an environment
to really look at what set of moral skills are salient given a scenario and then can
be applied to the agents’ relationships at large.
So, this view is particularly appealing for a number of reasons. First, it argues
that our pariality is a kind of disposition. Specifically, that we often naturally find
ourselves attuned to the “the weal and woe” of those close to us. And second,
that this much is not a deficiency in our moral reasoning but in fact a skill to be
developed that helps in our moral education. Third, and finally, this view will not
serve to confuse the agent so far as where their attention should be placed in partial
decision making. This much is true because the account tells the agent to place
all their moral attention on the object of concern, the other person they are being
partial to. Now, let us observe how these themes appear in the virtue theories.
Aristotle’s theory of friendship, developed in part by the puzzles of friendship
leveled by Plato in the Lysis, is strictly speaking partial.47 In fact, he explicitly
44 Murdoch, 30. This is also echoed by Blum pp. 67-70.
45 Murdoch, 36. The point of education is also made by Blum pp. 74-75.
46 Murdoch, 37.
47 For more on the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of friendship and the Lysis, see Julia
Annas, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism,” Mind 86 (1977), pp. 532-554; Lorraine
Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 20-36; and Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, Plato’s Lysis, (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005), 312-322.
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states that “it is finer to benefit friends than to benefit strangers.”48 Two recent
commentators have argued for competing views of partiality with respect to Aris-
totle. Specifically, Jennifer Whiting (1991) has argued that Aristotle’s formulation
of our partiality is “largely a function of historical and psychological accident.”49
Against this, Diane Jeske (1997) has argued that this view is far too impersonal.50
I agree with Jeske on this point. But Jeske then goes on to argue for a formulation
of the relationship view. Specifically, she claims that friendships, although this
applies to relationships on the whole, “generate further moral reasons.”51 I disagree
with this point, considering the critiques of the relationship view made above.
Running parallel to this, Mencius’ account of partiality is a formulation of the
relationship view. This is most apparent in his description of filial relationships.
Specifically, he claims that “the most authentic expression of humaneness is serving
one’s parents” and “the most authentic expression of rightness is following one’s
older brother.”52 These ought not be taken strictly at face value as much of Men-
cius’ writing is described in metaphor. But, it is clear that Mencius takes specific
relationships to direct us to ľı – often translated as ritual, propriety, or proper con-
duct as found in duties toward others. This much also seems to be the case for
friends on Mencius’ account.53 But, like before, the relationship view is undesirable
for a number of reasons.
The Stoics take great care to construct a strictly impartial philosophy.54 This
much seems to spell danger for us. With no agreement between these thinkers,
how are we to construct a coherent theory of partiality from them? Fortunately,
this concern does not actually impede on the project’s outcome. The readings of
Aristotle’s theory may be correct. And indeed, the positions of Mencius and the
Stoics are clear from the outset. But, the goal is not to argue on behalf of any
48 NE, (1169b10).
49 Jennifer Whiting’s “Impersonal Friends,” The Monist 74 (1991), pp. 23.
50 Diane Jeske, “Friendship, Virtue, and Impartiality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 57 (1997), pp. 51-72. David Brink also levels similar criticism in his “Eudaimonism, Love
and Friendship, and Political Community,” Social Philosophy Policy 16 (1999), 252–289.
51 Jeske, 69.
52 Mencius, Mencius, translated by Irene Bloom, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009),
[4A27].
53 Mencius, [5B3].
54 The feature of impartiality is made clear by Epictetus in his Discourses, translated by Robin
Hard, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2.22. Julia Annas gives a great overview of the
Stoic conception of impartiality especially as it relates to friendship in The Morality of Happiness,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 262-276.
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one of these theories specifically. Instead, it is to create a uniquely virtue ethical
position of partiality with respect to friendship.
John Cottingham (1996) offers us the best solution for uniting the virtue theories
more generally. He argues that partiality is implicitly baked into the virtues. And,
although Cottingham only argues this for Aristotle’s virtue theory, this argument
is attractive for its ability to be easily generalized to any other virtue theory. For
example, a virtue like courage is partial so far as it “enhances the personal prestige
of the holder, and by its value within the interconnected networks of honor and
mutual respect which bind the citizens of a community.” Similarly, a virtue like
temperance is partial so far as it is directed toward those intemperate physiological
desires we biologically inherit.55 Indeed, at no point is his argument predicated on
a position exclusive to Aristote. So, it can be applied to the virtue theories at large.
The virtues are taken as dispositions thought to be crafted into skills in every
virtue theory. Aristotle explains this using the notion of habituation. He claims
that it is necessary to “acquire one sort of habit or another” toward the virtues
and that these “actions should accord with the correct reason.”56 These habits are
consciously attuned responses to particular situations.57 The Stoics follow Aristotle
in this regard and agree that the virtues are a “craft.”58 And, Mencius frequently
employs the multiple meanings of ľı to refer to the ritualistic or habitual nature of
ľı and the practice of the virtues.
So, the virtues are argued to be dispositions that can be crafted into skills. How
exactly do we hone these skills aside from habituation? Each theory responds in
a different, although congruent way. Aristotle makes the case for the application
of a kind of evaluative intelligence which he labels as phronesis. Mencius argues
for a kind of sustained attention that involves the mental habit of self-examination
(shu) and the goal oriented activity of steering activities toward positive outcomes.
55 John Cottingham, “Partiality and the Virtues,” in How Should One Live? ed. Roger Crisp,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 59-60. See Lee H. Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas:
Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, (Albany, SUNY Press, 1990) for a comparative
reading of courage in Confucian and Western thought.
56 NE, (1103b24) and (1103b33).
57 Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13.
58 See Cicero, On Ends, translated by H. Rackham, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1914), 3.24 and A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 61G.
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This is referred to as si.59 And, the Stoics argue in favor of a kind of situational
awareness that allows the agent to develop a concern for others. This is referred to
as oikeiosis.
To be clear, each of these are their own distinct definition behind them. But,
they are united so far as each is a particular kind of moral attunement. We can
quickly describe this by extending the metaphor of sight given to us by Murdoch.
Phronesis is a kind of moral perception that allows us to see what is most important
in a situation. This sight has a particular focus on how conductive certain actions
are conducive to a good and happy life. Si is a kind of moral attention that
involves seeing contradictions in one’s motivations and realigning those motivations
to conform to virtuous action. And oikeiosis is a kind of moral expansion that
involves seeing how other people are a part of my own concern – how I should
see them as belonging to me somehow and how I should treat them.60 But more
generally, phronesis, si, and oikeiosis are particular dispositions that attune us to
virtuous decision making. These moral attunements are not rule based and they
do not have a blueprint for instruction. They are attunements that command our
attention and force us to observe a situation in order to make judgments from the
factors of that situation in and of itself. In agreement, Williams (1995) observes
for phronesis that these moral attunements make us alive to and guide us to a
“repertoire of considerations that operate for or against courses of action.”61
I take these moral attunements to identify the same thing both Murdoch and
Blum identify when they speak of “really looking” and paying acute attention to the
“weal and woe” of those around you. That is, a specific observational disposition
we have toward our surroundings, especially those we love. And, a disposition
that can be cultivated into a skill. Moreover, similar to Murdoch and Blum, these
attunements are partial. That is, if we are to take the virtues to be partial, as
59 Mencius makes this clear at [1A7]. Confucius also argues this at selected points in his Analects,
translated by Annping Chin, (New York: Penguin, 2014); 4:15, 12:1, and 15:24.
60 To be clear, oikeiosis is distinct from phronesis and si so far as it is not described by the
Stoics as an intellectual trait. Instead, it is a quite tangible activity of virtuous expansion. The
distinctions between intellectual traits like phronesis or si and oikeiosis are important, but a
detailed discussion of this is outside the scope of this paper. Briefly, the Stoic intent is to expand
our field of concern to eventually everything. So, their theory, as already noted, is impartial. But
in this paper we employ a reduced form of oikeiosis to simply note the idea of extending one’s
concern to others in a limited sense.
61 Bernard Williams, “Acting as the Virtuous Person Acts,” in Aristotle and Moral Realism,
ed. Robert Heinaman, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 18.
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Cottingham argues, we must also take these moral attunements to be partial as
they are not only attunements to the world around you, but the virtues as well.
What results is not dissimilar from Velleman’s notion of loved ones arresting
our emotions. Indeed, these moral attunements arrest our moral attention toward
others, especially friends because they are frequently a part of our moral consid-
erations, specifically their well-being. What is found in the cognitive space of the
agent will not be thoughts of the relationship, duty, or virtue. Instead, these moral
attunements arrest our attention such that the cognitive space of the agent will be
directed exclusively toward the other – that is their loved one, ie. friend. And, the
agent will not be worried with regard to virtue because it is a skill that has been
habitually practiced. Almost like a moral confidence, the agent acts with ease and
without extraneous thoughts.
The point of moral education follows naturally from this. Indeed, these moral
attunements are connected to our moral education, especially with our friends.
Julia Annas (2011) remarks that the virtues are learned in “embedded contexts”
such as “family, school, church, employment, siblings, friends,” etc.62 The notion of
embedded contexts in relation to virtue theories is crucial to our understanding of
friendship. This much is the case because all three virtue theories take friendship to
be a fundamental training ground for developing the virtues. Aristotle claims that
friends allow us to be “more capable of understanding and acting” in accordance
with the virtues and that friendships are advantageous for this reason. He also
adds that friends display our own deficiencies and help us when our own efforts are
not enough.63 These, along with a litany of other examples, show us that Aristotle
thinks of friendship as a training ground for the virtues.64
The importance of embedded contexts are not lost on the Stoics. In the best
source we have on friendship in Stoic thought, Seneca’s Moral Letters to Lucilius, we
find the friends Seneca and Lucilius in the process of moral education.65 So, as A.A.
Long (2013) observed, the entire work can “be read as a literary instance of Stoic
62 Annas, Intelligent Virtue, 21.
63 NE ; (1155a15-16), (1156b14-15), (1169b6-7), and (1172a13-15).
64 For more remarks related to this, see NE ; (1159b7-8), (1166a8-9), (1168a35-36), (1169a19-29),
(1170a12), and (1171a30-34).
65 For a specific discussion of friendship as it relates to the Stoics, see Seneca, Epistles, translated
by Richard M. Gummere, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917); 6, 9, 35, 52, 63.
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friendship in action.”66 And, Mencius similarly notes the importance of embedded
contexts in our moral education. For Mecius, this is frequently the family, but
mentions of friends also occur.67
So, superordinate to virtue, moral attunement, and partiality is a cycle of moral
education brought about by our friends and relationships at large. We can visualise
it in the commutative diagram below.
Partiality V irtue
Friendship Attunement
We find that our partiality influences virtue so far as the virtues are partial. Virtue
influences our moral attunement so far as our moral attunement is based in the
habitual practice of the virtues. Moral attunement influences friendship so far as
our friends arrest out our moral attention toward them. And, friendship influences
our partiality so far as we are partial to our friends. Finally, the cycle continues,
with each rotation giving us renewed opportunity to practice in our moral education.
To review, we take the virtue theories as partial because the virtues themselves
are partial. For example, generosity is not directed to the world at large, but to
a specific person or group of persons. What’s more, in utilizing the virtues each
virtue theory offers a distinct, but similar, moral attunement that aids in moral
perception and commands our attention to see what is truly important or salient
in a situation. A person who has practiced the virtues will feel a certain ease in
their practice of moral attunement. That is, it will feel like a disposition. Like a
master craftsman, who is able to notice the details of a specific grain pattern on a
piece of wood or observe a knot and how to utilize it to their advantage, the person
who has practiced the virtues will have a kind of dispositional moral attunement
when interacting with people or the world at large.
66 A.A. Long, “Friendship and Friends in the Stoic Theory of the Good Life” in Thinking About
Friendship: Historical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Damian Caluori, (New
York: Palegrave Macmillan, 2013), 229.
67 See Mencius; [4A6], [6A8], and [7B31]. For related points made by Confucius, see his Analects;
1:7, 5:26, 8:2, 12:23, 12:24, 13:28. This point is also argued by Shannon Vallor with relation to
Confucian thought in her Technology and the Virtues, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016),
50.
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What this offers us is an account of partiality that avoids thoughts about the self
(found in the project view), one’s relationship or duty (found in the relationship
view), and even the virtues. It allows for the individual to focus all their attention
onto the subject of concern, for example their friend and the friend’s well-being.
This much is true because friends arrest our moral attention so as they are a part
of our moral considerations. Further, this account offers us a clear understanding
of how this process is developed and taught. That is, through habituation and
practice, we are able to develop ourselves into a positive moral direction. And,
our friends offer us this training ground as the relationship offers both a training
partner and a space that is comfortable so far as you trust your friend. The partial
relationship serves as an arena for moral education for both parties in which both
can practice the virtues and hone their moral attunement.
Each one of these advantages appear in Murdoch and Blum’s formulation, al-
though the ancient theories aid in fleshing out these ideas. For these reasons, the
virtue theory of partiality is advantageous when observed in comparison to others
already argued against. That being said, there are objections which ought to be
responded to. The next section will field these objections. It will be clear that
these concerns can be reasonably defended against.
5. Objections
It has already been hinted that this formulation of partiality and friendship
is subject to criticism. The two objections I would like to field in this section
involve the critique of over moralizing friendship raised by C&K and the concern
of elitism raised earlier in this paper. We will first respond to the former, finding
ourselves only more susceptible to the later. But, both objections will be thoroughly
explained away upon further inspection.
Over moralizing friendship is certainly something we should be careful about
– recall the amiable drinking buddies. And, as C&K demonstrate, this much is
especially the case for the generally Aristotelian construction of friendship. So, the
first objection might be leveled as such: by utilizing a largely Aristotelian platform
in constructing this account of partiality in friendship, we have over moralized the
phenomenon of friendship.
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Against this, the case I have made for partiality in friendship as a moral phe-
nomenon is more than reasonable and although it is moralized, it is hardly over
moralized. This is especially true when we observe the fact that friendship is a fun-
damental training ground for practicing day-to-day morality as the virtue theories
notice. One cannot simply read Kant or Aristotle and fully intuit what morality
entails. Being moral is an inextricably social activity. One must be able to have an
environment where they are able to practice these skills. And, one does not need to
read Kant or Aristotle to be moral precisely because these moral lessons are taught
and practiced through our friendships (and relationships at large).
A parent watching their child in a playground can surely recall many occasions
where their child has wronged a friend (maybe Isabel took Jeffrey’s Tonka truck).
The expectation is that Jeffrey’s negative emotion elicits an empathetic identifi-
cation with Jeffrey in Isabel: ‘I would feel the same pain Jeffrey does if he took
my Hess truck,’ she thinks while returning the toy (maybe with a little parental
guidance).68 Through this, Isabel has learned a new moral lesson – do not steal,
especially from friends. And, next time she sees Jeffrey, she will have an opportu-
nity to practice this. If she fails, it is safe to say that Jeffrey might not think of her
as a friend anymore. What’s more, Jeffrey might also learn a valuable moral lesson
in forgiveness.
What we learn from this is that friendship is able to reinforce our practical
understanding of moral activities characteristic in a good and happy life. That is,
friendship helps us develop our character in a better direction – especially with
regard to relationships, skills, and evaluative intelligence as found in the section
above. Convincingly, the state of scientific research has shown evidence that this
is the case. Cacioppo and Patrick argue that the fundamentally social nature of
humans manifests itself both psychologically and physiologically in our frequently
moral/altruistic behavior.69
With all of this, it is hard to imagine a friendship that is completely independent
of moral values. Whether or not it is on the playground or in the office, our
68 This is commonly referred to as the ‘empathy-altruism hypothesis’ and is among the most
common views in the psychological literature of moral development. For more, see Daniel Baston,
The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer, (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1991) and Martin Hoffman, Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring
and Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
69 Cacioppo and Patrick, 113-197.
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friendships are where we are most likely to learn and develop in our moral education.
So, I take it that my account of partiality in friendship is not over moralized.
But, now we run into the problem of elitism. Let’s up the ante from the Isabel
Jeffery example and return to the example of Denise asking us to move a dead body
with her. Last we left, we objected to this telling Denise that moving the body
is not constitutive of her well-being or in her best interest. Reasonably enough,
she scoffed all while thinking, ‘what does this guy know about my interests and
my well-being?’ Denise’s critique, telling us to get off our high horse, is reasonable
enough.
That being said, I take this critique of elitism to be directed primarily at the
language of how to address the situation with Denise. We critique our friends’
decision making frequently and without conflict. We also often give our friends
advice on life and what decisions to make in order to live a good and happy life
similarly without conflict. Of course if we tell Denise, quite robotically, that moving
the body is not constitutive of her well-being she will take it as a kind of affront
to her rationality. But, as friends, we can find better ways to subtly give this
information to Denise.
Recall that we take partiality in friendship to be a particular skill in seeing
the relevant features of a situation. Similar to how a master craftsman is able to
discern facts from the grain of wood they are working with, or how to manipulate
a particular knot into an advantage of their project, the skilled friend “has learned
from years of experience how to discern distinctions of worth that those without
his skill cannot see.”70 That is to say, a skilled friend who is well attuned to the
characteristics and temperaments of their friend will not only know what to tell their
friend in a situation like this, but also how to tell their friend with compassion, love,
and style. Maybe Denise is in need of an indirect explanation of why this is not
in her best interests. Possibly Denise is of an analytic disposition and we need
to employ a rigorous argument to explain why this is not in her best interest.
Regardless, the skilled friend will be able to know what to say and how to say it in
order to be partial to Denise’s best interests and well-being.
70 Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics
to Find Meaning in a Secular Age, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 208.
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Still, it is hardly the case that any of us are perfectly skilled friends entirely
attuned to every moment of a situation. We will fail. And it can be reasonably
said that we fail frequently in our friendships. This much is especially true when
assessing what are in the best interests of others well-being. But, we ought to
take these failures as the craftsman would and learn from our mistakes. This much
is reinforced by the fact that we take friendship to be inextricable from our moral
education. Accordingly, these failures are instances and opportunities for perfecting
our craft of being partial to our friends. As one punk band puts it, these experiences
allow us to “feel the pain of self-improvement.”71 All we can truly hope for is that
we are not encountered with a situation quite as extreme as Denise’s.
So, is moving the body with Denise still an option? Simply said, yes. Given the
correct circumstances, the well attuned friend may deem it reasonable that being
partial to Denise implies moving the body with her. That being said, it would likely
require extreme circumstances for that to be in the best interests of Denise. Still,
this does not further imply that friendship is not a moral phenomenon as C&K
have argued. It is quite the opposite so far as the attuned friend has weighed the
moral considerations of the given scenario and deemed it morally permissible to
help Denise.
6. Conclusion
I have emphasized the notion of a situational moral attunement to be crafted like
a skill in order to be partial to our friends. Further, I have explained that being
partial to our friends is inextricably tied to our moral education and positively
benefits the crafting of this situational attunement. In doing this, I have given a
reasonable alternative to the project view, the relationship view, Consequentialist
formulations of partiality, and Kantian formulations of partiality. Further, it has
shown that C&K are wrong to think that friendship is not a moral phenomenon.
Indeed, friendship has proved to be not only a prudential good, but also a moral
good. To conclude, I’d like to emphasise this last point. It is hard to disagree
that friends are a prudential good in one’s life. That is, friends constitute one of
the many pleasurable goods of a life well lived. And, in their landmark article,
Very Happy People, psychologists Ed Diener and Martin Seligman (2002) showed
71 AJJ, ”Skate Park,” on Knife Man, (Monte Sereno: Asian Man Records, 2014).
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convincing evidence that friends are necessary for a good and happy life so far as
that life is pleasurable.72 Since then, numerous psychological articles have echoed
this.73 But, because of the limitations of psychological research, none have been
able to speak toward the value of friendship in a morally good life. I hope that it
is now clear that friendship is also valuable in a moral life well worth lived.
References
1. AJJ, ”Skate Park,” on Knife Man, (Monte Sereno: Asian Man Records, 2014)
2. Mark Alfano, “Friendship and the Structure of Trust,” in From Personality to Virtue: Essays
on the Philosophy of Character, ed. Alberto Masala and Jonathan Webber, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2016), pp. 186-206.
3. Julia Annas, “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism,” Mind 86 (1977), pp. 532-554.
4. —, The Morality of Happiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
5. —, Intelligent Virtue, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, translated by Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
7. —, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999).
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Satisfaction and Happiness” Journal of Happiness Studies 11 (2010), pp. 243-259; Nicholas Bilyk,
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